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Abstract
Botnets are a threat to computer systems and users around the world. Botmasters can
range from annoying spam email propagators to nefarious criminals. These criminals
attempt to take down networks or web servers through distributed denial-of-service
attacks, to steal corporate secrets, or to launder money from individuals or corporations.
As the number and severity of successful botnet attacks rise, computer security experts
need to develop better early-detection and removal techniques to protect computer
networks and individual computer users from these very real threats. I will define botnets
and describe some of their common purposes and current uses. Next, I will reveal some
of the techniques currently used by software security professionals to combat this
problem. Finally, I provide a novel defensive strategy, the White-hat Bot (WHB), with
documented experiments and results that may prove useful in the defense against botnets
now and in the future.
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THE WHITE-HAT BOT: A NOVEL BOTNET DEFENSE STRATEGY

I. Introduction
General Issue
The goal of this research is to explore the problem domain of botnets and to
present a novel approach, the White-hat Bot (WHB), for their detection. This research
focuses on the distributed nature of botnets and explores how botnet technology can be
used to locate bot client and bot server applications by analyzing the incoming and
outgoing network messages on the bot client or server machines.
Some estimates show that as many as 40 percent of all computers are part of a bot
network (Zhu et al., 2008). Anti-virus software can detect known bot software, firewall
software can block specified ports and applications, and intrusion detection systems
(IDS) can detect and block known exploits. When a new botnet exploit is created, many
times it will go undetected and have a wide range of negative effects for a period of time
before being reported, analyzed, and a subsequent remedy created and deployed on a
large scale to prevent future infection. It is this delay that I attempt to minimize with the
WHB by providing a way to more quickly detect novel threats.
The concept primarily consists of analysis of the network traffic on any machines
that are suspected of an unknown infection. To determine if a machine is suspect is a
difficult problem that requires input from the user’s machine, but that input can be
unspecific such as the machine running slower than usual, or an application running in
the background that was not authorized, either directly or indirectly, by any legitimate
user or administrator of that machine. Undetermined anomalous behavior can be
1

detected by automated sensors on the user’s machine, such as by some anti-virus
software, firewall software, IDS software, system memory analysis tools, disk usage
monitoring tools, etc. (Chandrashekar, Orrin, Livadas, & Schooler, 2009).
Certain botnet exploits disable anti-virus software and prevent that software from
downloading and installing the latest virus definitions, leaving them vulnerable to some
known threats (Chandrashekar et al., 2009). One potential problem indicator could be
determined by a tracking mechanism implemented at the anti-virus vendor’s location (or
at a local administrator’s level for a network of nodes) to determine the subset of
machines that have not, for whatever reason, downloaded the latest anti-virus signatures
or other security patches and updates. These nodes may automatically be considered
suspect if there is no valid reason, such as the machine being powered down or
disconnected from the network, for the lack of timely updates.
This tracking mechanism could be as simple as a check-in feature that identifies
each node by a serial number assigned to that node’s copy of the anti-malware software
whenever the application connects to the update server to download the latest patch,
signatures, or updates. This would allow the vendor to maintain a database that could be
used to identify users with potential problems. For the purposes of this research it is
assumed that there is some sort of reporting mechanism in place, and that the
experimental nodes are all considered suspect. This allows the focus of the research to be
on the analysis of network traffic for the detection of the specific novel applications that
are responsible for the undesired botnet behavior.
How real is the threat of botnets? Norman Elton and Matt Keel called bot
networks “the single greatest threat facing humanity” (Schiller et al., 2007). While there
2

are no doubt greater ills in the world such as the deterioration of the family, poverty and
violent crime, botnets are nonetheless real problems that must be taken seriously.
One paper focuses on the threat posed by Al Qaeda operatives who possess
interest in cyber terror plots (The Lipman Reports Editors, 2010). These operatives
currently use websites and chat rooms to recruit, teach terrorist skills such as bomb
building, and other nefarious activities. The authors suspect that these terrorists may be
behind some of the recent computer network attacks in South Korea and elsewhere. The
authors further speculate that these could be “dry runs” in preparation for a massive
attack that may include physical attacks combined with cyber attacks.

A recent

government security exercise involved an attack via 20 million compromised smart
phones. With the current widespread popularity of such devices, this type of scenario
seems very plausible.
The number of existing botnets is indeterminate because there are potentially
untold millions of bots, both active and inactive, that have yet to be discovered.
Numerous new machines are infected and added to the list on a daily basis.
“MessageLabs Intelligence tracks at least 21,000 active spam-sending bots in the US in
an

average

week”

(Wood,

Between

2010).

“January

and

June

2006,

Symantec…observed more than 4.5 million distinct, active bot network computers”
(Schiller et al., 2007). “The anti-botnet vendor FireEye…” posts even higher estimates of
“…150 million bot-infected computers worldwide” (Hunter, 2008).
There are many exploits perpetuated by botnets such as targeted distributed denial
of service (DDoS) attacks, malware dissemination, spam message generation, identity
theft, etc. I will briefly discuss one common exploit here. One fraudulent activity
3

perpetuated by botnets involves ad services such as Google’s AdSense which pays
website owners revenue for posting the AdSense banner on their web site (Google, 2012).
The AdSense banner displays messages from legitimate business websites, and
Google pays the site owner a per-click fee for every legitimate visitor who clicks an
advertisement banner. The botmaster creates a bot that is programmed to visit the
botmaster’s own websites to click on the advertisements displayed in the AdSense
banners. Since these clicks originate from IP addresses around the world, i.e., the
botmaster’s infected clients, they are seen as legitimate traffic and the botmaster is paid
for each click. This technique is commonly known as click fraud. “Once criminals start
to build their click fraud network, they can start earning real money” (Ollmann, 2009).
There are many other exploits possible, but the focus of this research is on the detection
of botnets, so the discussion will be to that end.
The objective of this research is to determine the value of botnet technology
retooled toward the detection of malicious botnets. The hypothesis is that the distributed
nature of botnets provides a useful advantage over current methods of botnet detection.
One of the primary advantages of this methodology can be leveraged by the fact that
botnets are not limited to a specific administrative domain. A botnet has the ability to
span an arbitrary number of domains, as does the WHB, and as such the WHB has the
potential to be used on every machine within one or more malicious botnet domains.
Under the right circumstances this provides the WHB the ability to operate on every
infected node of a malicious botnet, to include all of that botnet’s Command and Control
(CC) servers. This provides the WHB the potential to completely eradicate a malicious
botnet. If the WHB is only installed on a subset of a given botnet, then the data collected
4

from that subset can be shared with other anti-malware companies in order to detect the
botnet software on other non-WHB nodes.
Investigative Questions
Will the WHB be more effective than current methods, such as typical botdetection software, to locate zero-day malicious bot network applications running on
infected hosts? If so, what methods and best practices must be applied to make this
possible?
Will the distributed nature of botnets and the methods employed by malicious bot
masters be beneficial in the detection of novel bot threats?
Can the benefits of current tools be leveraged and amplified by their use in a
distributed bot network? If so, how?
If these methods do prove to be more effective, they will be a valuable tool for the
Department of Defense and for the entire malware defense industry.
Summary
The threat botnets pose to computing systems of all types is undeniable and
imminent. The relevance of this threat was summed up by President Barack Obama
when he said, “So cyberspace is real. And so are the risks that come with it. It’s the
great irony of our Information Age—the very technologies that empower us to create and
to build also empower those who would disrupt and destroy. And this paradox—seen
and unseen—is something that we experience every day” (2009).
This research effort attempts to minimize the threats botnets pose by
implementing a novel botnet detection strategy, the White-hat Bot, toward the detection
5

of novel botnet threats. The WHB leverages the distributive nature of botnets, combined
with current tools, to successfully detect the presence of malicious botnet software.

6

II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
This chapter presents an overview of the botnet problem and explores a
representative cross-section of the existing body of research in the area of botnet defense
strategies, with a focus on current methods of botnet detection. This is done in
preparation for the experimentation and botnet research study that follow.
A Botnet Survey
My definition of a botnet: a botnet is an extension of the concept of malicious
software, such as a virus or worm, in which the malware provides a CC communication
channel between the malicious code and the botmaster or bot-herder who uses this
communication channel to control the botnet. According to malware data analyst Dan
Bleaken of Symantec Hosted Services, “Botnets are distributed networks of ‘zombie’ or
‘bot’ PCs, infected by malware which enables them to be marshaled by cybercriminals –
primarily to distribute enormous volumes of spam and other malware and launch
phishing attacks via email” (Bleaken, 2010). The ability of this specialized malware to
communicate creates opportunities for the attacker and it provides novel threats to the
computing community at large.
Botnets are often classified by their CC architecture (Feily, Shahrestani, &
Ramadass, 2009). The common architectures are IRC (Internet Relay Chat), HTTP
(Hypertext Transport Protocol), DNS (Domain Name System), and P2P (Peer to Peer)
based architectures.
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With IRC botnets, the bots connect to a predetermined chat channel on an IRC
server that the CC server also joins. The CC server sends commands to this channel, and
the bots execute these commands and post their responses back to the same channel. This
is the most popular method of communication for botnets, primarily because of the
number of open source IRC applications available and the simplicity of deploying one.
There are also numerous free web hosting services that allow anonymous vectors to set
up chat channels, many of which are not actively monitored for botnet collaboration.
HTTP botnets communicate through standard web servers. HTTP botnets are the
latest variety to become popular with cyber criminals, with the first web based botnets
architectures appearing in 2005 (Koo, Chang, & Wei, 2011). The first of the HTTP
based BlackEnergy botnet variants was located the following year. Free web server
libraries and frameworks make creation of simple to complex web servers easy and cheap
or even free in many cases. With the abundance of free web hosting available around the
globe, it is trivial to deploy a free web server without necessarily knowing in what state,
or even in what country, the physical hardware is located. HTTP bots may use a
centralized web server or a distributed hierarchical set of web servers in order to
communicate with their botmaster. Messages are formed as HTTP packets and often use
standard internet traffic ports, but they are still free to use any port of their choice. Using
standard internet ports may allow the application to avoid detection, as any traffic on
these ports is typically trusted by default by firewall and IDS tools (Singh, Srivastava,
Giffin, & Lee, 2008).
DNS based botnets use proxy servers in an effort to hide the true location of the
CC server (Zhu et al., 2008). A proxy server acts as a communication intermediary by
8

forwarding messages while appearing to either side as the originator or sink for each
message. In this way, the IP address of the CC server remains hidden, and a particular
bot appears only to communicate with the proxy server. Fast-flux is an application that is
often used for this purpose (Zhu et al. 2008). It allows for a list of compromised
computer’s IP addresses to periodically rotate for a particular DNS record, allowing one
DNS record to alternate proxy servers over time. This increases the difficulty of tracing
the traffic path from a bot to the controlling server.
The P2P botnet architecture propagates commands through the botnet using some
structured or unstructured algorithm. This architecture can vary greatly and may emulate
the message passing structures seen in certain popular P2P applications such as Napster
or Gnutella, and others (Grizzard, Sharma, Nunnery, Kang, & Dagon, 2007).

In a

hierarchical P2P configuration, the botmaster may send and receive all messages through
one or more superpeers. That superpeer then forwards the message to a small group of
peers at a lower echelon, who in turn propagate them to an arbitrary number of lower
level peers until the message has eventually reached all bots. Another important part of
this type of network is a mechanism to allow new peers to join and to facilitate peers who
fail or otherwise leave the network. Redundant network overlays and alternate peer lists
may help to keep the network stable in the face of uncertainty.
None of the communications frameworks mentioned here are mutually exclusive.
It is possible to build hybrid botnets that incorporate two or more of these
communications methodologies in complex ways in order to create a robust network. For
instance, a P2P botnet may incorporate an HTTP communications construct, and use
Fast-flux to rotate the IP addresses of the DNS records that point to its CC servers.
9

Botnet Design Notes
As anti-bot technology has advanced, so have evasion techniques. Regardless,
anti-virus and anti-spyware technologies have come a long way in recent times.
Typically, anti-virus programs detect the signatures of known malware and subsequently
quarantine and eradicate the program on the infected machine. Bot creators are fully
aware of this technique; hence, many of the latest bots are modular and polymorphic in
design. Modularity provides the bot with the ability to be sent as a very small initial
infection program. Once the initial program has infected a machine, it communicates this
achievement to the botmaster. The botmaster can then forward the next software module
to the bot through a communication channel of choice. This secondary module often
incorporates new capability that is often used to disable any running anti-virus, firewall,
and anti-spyware programs, making the victim machine a softer target (Chandrashekar et
al., 2009). Some bots institute website blacklists to disallow the user from going to antivirus websites, or any other site that may be considered detrimental to the life of the bot.
Once this stage succeeds, the botmaster is again notified to send the next module
(Schiller et al., 2007).
In the next phase, another module may be sent and installed to further enhance
capabilities of the bot. Now that the system’s defenses are down, the serious payloads
can be more easily executed and are less likely to be compromised. The botmaster can
install spambot functionality, key and click logging programs, some of which are capable
of overcoming the on-screen keyboards used by some banks and government pay system
websites by returning a screen capture for each mouse click, among myriad other
capabilities. TeamDev’s Java API, JxCapture, is an example of a software library that
10

provides this type of functionality, for both still images and live video screen capture
functions (TeamDev, 2012). Also, self-destruction and stealth functionality can be
achieved. File systems can be scanned and sensitive files can be sent back to the
botmaster with relative ease. Bot modularity provides the botmaster the ability to add
new functionality, at will, to any or all of her bots as the need arises.
Polymorphic design allows the bot to evolve over time, altering its own signatures
just enough to evade detection by the applications that might detect and eradicate it. This
advent makes it even more difficult for security software developers to combat.
From this point on, I will refer to anti-virus vendors, anti-spyware vendors,
firewall providers, etc., as security software providers (SSP), unless individual
identification is necessary to stress a particular point.
An interesting variant of the typical botnet is called the “roving bugnet”. This
botnet focuses on a single, high-value target: specifically an individual person. The
concept behind the bugnet is that users can be assumed to have multiple networkconnected devices with cameras and microphones. If a would-be attacker were to install
a bot on an individual’s cell phone, laptop, desktop, and work PC, it would be plausible
for them to take over these devices’ cameras and microphones to monitor just about
everything the victim does. Ryan Farley and Xinyuan Wang created such a bugnet that
was fully functional. As long as the target was “in the physical proximity of a
compromised device for a microphone to pick up the victim’s sound,” the botmaster was
able to monitor the activities of that victim (Farley & Wang, 2010).
Farley and Wang were able to deploy the bot on systems from Windows 95 to
Vista, and Mac OS X. Additionally, they were capable of dynamically infecting and
11

taking over additional devices belonging to the user. Farley and Wang’s research
illustrates the flexibility of botnets and why they are an attractive adversarial tool sought
after by many groups.
Relevant Research
BotHunter
BotHunter is a freely available bot detection tool, created by a U.S. Army
research effort, which advertises the ability to detect and to profile novel bot networks by
network packet analysis (Gu, Porras, Yegneswaran, Fong, & Lee, 2007). This tool uses a
“heavily modified and customized” version of the Snort IDS, combined with a correlation
engine used to “model dialog production patterns against an abstract malware infection
lifecycle model” (SRI International, 2012). BotHunter is used to detect novel botnets
without the use of known signatures and without any a priori knowledge of the specific
botnet modeled.
Sevy retooled and deployed Cybercraft, a Department of Defense project, as a
botnet and passed botnet command messages within the normally unused media access
control (MAC) address field of address resolution protocol (ARP) messages (Sevy,
2009). By applying this methodology, he was able to evade detection by BotHunter.
This work shows that tools such as BotHunter are not always able to detect novel botnets
and that more research is necessary to combat this growing problem.
BotHunter is designed to operate on a single edge node of a given network. This
edge node is used to monitor all incoming and outgoing network messages. Using this
methodology does not produce the distributed gains attained by the WHB
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implementation. Another weakness of this methodology is that the monitor node
becomes a single point of failure and creates a bottleneck in the network. The
performance of the network, and the performance of the detection operations, may suffer
during peak traffic times if packets are dropped or ignored for the lack of available
resources on the monitor node due to an overload condition.
In this research effort, BotHunter is used in an attempt to detect the Enhanced
SLINGbot (System for Live Investigation of Next Generation Botnets) simulated
malicious botnets. This trial will be used as a baseline comparison in order to determine
the effectiveness of the WHB.
Anti-virus Applications
Typical anti-virus software performs static analysis of files on a computer. These
applications look for specific signatures of known malicious binaries. These methods
have proven useful in determining the presence of known threats. Unfortunately, they do
not address new threats in a timely manner. New threats must be reported, the binaries
must be captured, and an anti-virus signature created and published to all users before the
threat is contained.
Kaspersky Anti-Virus is one of the many commercial anti-virus products
available on the market today. It advertises both a static and dynamic analysis capability.
The static analysis evaluates the binaries and detects specific signatures within those
binaries, with a high rate of precision, only for known threats. Additionally, they apply a
heuristic method within their static analysis to attempt the detection of novel threats.
This analysis counts the number of potentially suspicious system calls within the binary.
If the number of these suspicious calls exceeds some preset threshold, the application is
13

then marked as suspicious and the user is notified. However, the disclaimer for this
heuristic methodology is that “the detection rate for new malicious code is low, while the
false positive rate is high” (Kaspersky Lab, 2012).
Kaspersky’s dynamic analysis mechanism emulates execution of a portion of the
application within a sandboxed environment prior to allowing the executable to be
executed as normal by the system. During this sandboxed execution mode, detection of
anomalous behavior is attempted and logged. When this method is combined with the
static heuristic scans, they claim that the detection rates are higher and the false positive
rates are much lower than with static scans alone for novel threats. The drawback to this
analysis is that the user must wait for this scan to take place before the system allows
their application to execute. Additionally, “the dynamic method requires significantly
more system resources than the static method” (Kaspersky Lab, 2012).
While the WHB does require the use of some system resources on the user’s
machine, it does not require any wait for the user to start any applications on their PC.
Further, the WHB focuses on the way in which applications communicate with processes
on other machines in order to detect malicious use. Hence, Kaspersky and other SSP
applications are still necessary to detect malware that does not communicate, such as
worms and viruses, but for malware that communicates, other solutions, such as the
WHB may make better sense since they focus upon these communications to detect the
botnet software present.
While anti-virus software is likely to always have a place in malware detection for
known threats, and even some novel threats, other detection methods will be useful to
detect threats such as novel botnets. One way in which botnets can evade detection from
14

anti-virus software is by dynamic recompilation using a random code generator in order
to change the signatures of their binaries (Muhaya, Khan, & Xiang, 2011). The WHB
addresses these concerns with the ability to detect botnets based upon the way they
communicate with other nodes, regardless of the state of their compiled binaries. The
hypothesis is that even in the face of a code generator changing a particular bot’s
binaries, the botnet’s network messages must still conform to a specific interface format
in order for the network to continue to communicate effectively. It is these
communications packets that will not change with a recompilation of a given bot, without
a synchronized recompilation of the entire bot network, which is not impossible, but a
highly unlikely event. When an entire botnet does change the layout of their messages
within the system, we can still rely on the fact that the WHB may still be able to detect
these messages since the detection rules may be very generalized to find patterns in the
messages that will likely still exist.
Firewall Software
Firewall software blocks messages from specific communications ports and
specific applications from entering a network or a specific machine. Like anti-virus
scanning, this methodology can only protect against known threats, and only to a certain
extent. To get around a firewall, an application may simply find a non-standard port that
is not blocked by the firewall application and use a different application name or IP
address to send its messages. Alerts from a firewall application may be able to warn that
a specific IP address is sending a message to a specific port, and it may subsequently
block that port, but the application may then simply try another port.
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Using the standard version of Snort, the WHB can scan all network messages,
regardless of the port used or the application responsible for sending the message. This
provides the WHB the ability to detect malicious messages, even if the sending
application dynamically alters the communications port used from time to time.
Honeypots
Honeypots or honeynets are computers or networks that are set up by researchers
or security experts to attract botnets and other forms of malware. Often these honeypots
are implemented with sandboxed virtual machines to help reduce the chances that the
honeypot itself can be used by perpetrators to launch actual attacks on innocent victims.
They sometimes employ a black-hole approach to most outgoing communications to
avoid the damage that may be caused to others by the infected honeypot’s outgoing
messages (Feily et al. 2009). In this way, a bot installed on a honeypot node can receive
instruction from its CC, but messages from the bot will not be delivered. The OS will not
report this failure to send to the bot application; thus, as far as the bot application knows,
its outgoing messages were sent by the OS. One example of an ongoing honeypot effort
is the Honeynet Project, “…a leading international security research organization,
dedicated to investigating the latest attacks and developing open source security tools to
improve Internet security” (Honeynet Project, 2012).
Honeypots lure in malware by purposefully leaving wide gaps in the security of
the installation of the system. Some of the methods used to accomplish this are by
installing outdated operating systems without the latest updates and patches, and by
neglecting to install any SSP applications. The researchers then monitor the node or
network in order to discover the exploits that are attempted and to capture the malware
16

that is installed. This is one of the primary methods used by SSPs to capture malware in
the wild in order to create new detection signatures and tools.
One problem with honeypots is that many of the more advanced malware
applications have devised ways to detect honeypots in an effort to avoid them. In fact,
many malware variants include the capability of detecting virtual machine environments,
and when detected, the application opts out of infecting that node because these
environments are typically not useful to the botmaster. Honeypot avoidance is critical to
the longevity of the malware, since installation on a honeypot will ultimately result in the
publication of defensive measures to defeat it.
The WHB addresses honeypot avoidance measures by operating on the actual
systems of live users, or on the data servers that users frequently access. In contrast to a
honeypot, the assumption is that the typical user will apply at least some set of standard
defensive measures, such as SSP applications. Since some defensive measures are likely,
any malware installed on their machine is more likely to either be novel and thus
undetectable with many of the current standard methods, or advanced enough to evade or
disable typical system defensive measures.
Regardless of their potential weaknesses, honeypots have proven useful in the
field of novel botnet detection. Even though the WHB is geared for use on live networks,
it too is a tool that may be used to monitor honeypot nodes in order to aid in the
discovery of novel botnets.

17

Summary
This chapter presented an overview of the botnet problem and some of the tactics
used to propagate malware. I discussed some of the tools and techniques currently used
to defend against this threat, including BotHunter, KasperSky anti-virus, and honeypots.
Now that a wide swath of information regarding the botnet phenomenon has been
covered, I will move on to a discussion of the WHB, the tools used in and rationale
behind its construction, the experimental setup, and how these results will be measured.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to review the tools and techniques used in building
and evaluating the effectiveness of the WHB. First, I discuss the Snort Intrusion
Detection System (Snort IDS) which captures and conducts analysis of network
communications packets to detect potential malicious content. Then, I will discuss the
SLINGbot (System for Live Investigation of Next Generation Botnets) and Enhanced
SLINGbot code frameworks generated by prior research in the field by Raytheon and
Mitre corporations, respectively. Next, I discuss the WHB designed as a part of this
research from the Enhanced SLINGbot code base with integration of the Snort IDS
system. Then, I discuss the Emulab testbed which will be used for large scale tests of the
WHB concept. Next, I lay out the experimental setup and evaluation plans. Lastly, I
cover the plans to compare the WHB concept to other existing botnet detection methods
and tools.
Snort
Snort, is an intrusion detection system (IDS) that detects malicious activity by
analyzing network packets and comparing them against a set of rules (Wuu & Chen,
2003). Because all botnet software communicates through network protocol messages,
Snort is a logical fit for their detection. Snort is used by BotHunter (SRI International,
2012), and it has been used in other bot detection research efforts (Wuu & Chen, 2003;
Still, 2011). Snort software is capable of operating on a local network to analyze every
packet on the network (inline configuration), or it can be configured to operate on an
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individual node, only analyzing packets sent to and from that node (passive mode). In
the WHB configuration, the tool operates on individual nodes in passive mode, scanning
only the traffic unique to that node, be it the origin or terminus node for a given
communications packet. In this manner, each host in a distributed bot network can report
on its individual status to the CC node. This reporting provides for micro analysis of
each host at the node level and for macro analysis of the entire network, by aggregation
of the micro data, at the bot network level. While Snort was the chosen tool used with
the WHB during this research effort, the WHB can easily be reconfigured to use any
arbitrary payload and to utilize any number tools to accomplish its mission.
One goal is consolidation of the results of packet capture from multiple nodes in
an effort to find common communication end points. When this is done, it should, in
theory, show that multiple hosts frequently communicate with a subset of specific IP
addresses. Granted, this will happen naturally between hosts and legitimate and popular
web servers, however, illegitimate bot servers may be identified more easily by ignoring
servers known to be legitimate. Although, caution should be exercised when ignoring
known servers that provide legitimate services, since these legitimate services may also
be exploited and used by illegitimate processes or used by persons for illegitimate
purposes. For instance, the server for a popular email service, such as Gmail, may be
exploited to carry CC messages for a botnet (Singh et al., 2008). Hence most of the
messages to and from a server may be for legitimate uses, but some subset of the
messages may contain malicious content related to a botnet. For this reason, a rule
should not be employed to completely ignore all such messages from known legitimate
sources without risking the possibility of missing botnet CC messages. A better policy is
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to scan all network packets (or some representative sample thereof), wherever feasible, to
ensure that none contain malware commands or malicious code.
Snort is capable of such packet analysis and is able to compare each packet to a
standard set of rules, in addition to customized rules. The WHB implementation uses
both the standard Snort rule set, and custom rules written to aid in the detection of real or
simulated malicious bot and CC server applications. When a packet triggers an alert, the
rule that caused the alert is included in the alert log. The lack of detection of a known
threat allows us to determine if the current set of Snort rules will detect the botnet or if
new custom rules are required.
Complex rules can be built to trigger alerts on any number of alert triggering
conditions. “Snort can perform protocol analysis and content searching/matching. It can
be used to detect a variety of attacks and probes, such as buffer overflows, stealth port
scans, CGI attacks, SMP probes, OS fingerprinting attempts, and much more. It uses a
flexible rules language to describe traffic that it should collect or pass, as well as a
detection engine that utilizes a modular plug-in architecture” (SourceFire, 2010).
SLINGbot and Enhanced SLINGbot
SLINGbot (A System for Live Investigation of Next Generation Botnets) and
Enhanced SLINGbot are tools engineered in the Python programming language on the
Linux operating system. They were provided by Raytheon’s BBN technologies and
Mitre Corporation, respectively.

The research done by BBN for SLINGbot is

summarized by Jackson et al. (2009). Since these tools were built with Python on a
Linux system, these same systems are likewise used in my research.
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The benign malicious botnets I use in my research are those provided by Mitre
Corporation as the sample bot networks built upon three separate bot code bases (Mitre
Corporation, 2010).

All three are implementations from the Enhanced SLINGbot

framework, and all three communicate with HTTP messages. The first is the Sample
Botnet, the second is the BlackEnergy Botnet and the third is the Torpig Botnet.
All three adversarial botnets described here are used in each of the experiments in
order to provide a variety of different networks for detection purposes. The Sample
botnet provides a very simple plain-text message base that proves trivial to detect. The
BlackEnergy botnet is valuable in that the sent commands are encrypted, thus increasing
the difficulty of detection. The Torpig implementation adds the challenge of detecting
multiple servers within a given implementation of this network.
It is expected that detection with the WHB will work for any botnet
implementation discussed in chapter II, whether it is HTTP, DNS, IRC, or P2P, since all
varieties have one thing in common, they all send and receive network messages. Since
the Enhanced SLINGbot framework is built solely upon an HTTP based communications
protocol, as is the WHB, this protocol is the focus of this research effort. It is assumed
that the methodology used will apply equally well to any of the other botnet
communications platforms.
Sample Botnet
The HTTP_Bot implementation of the Sample Bot is a simple example bot that
uses the Twisted Web Python library to build a server and client that communicate
through HTTP messages with post and get calls to the server, with simple reply messages

22

sent back to the bot (Twisted Matrix Labs, 2012). This implementation emulates typical
web traffic.
The server is the CC channel and is capable of supporting an arbitrary number of
bot clients.

The bot clients may be dispersed, as desired, among any number of

machines, located on any network connected to the internet. The bots connect to their
server using the IP address and port number that the server is listening on.

The

communication interface is handled by the Twisted library and the Enhanced SLINGbot
framework. The Sample Bot and Sample CC server send all their messages in clear text
and have only one simple command.
Upon execution of the bot, it connects to the server and sends it a “hello” request.
Upon receipt of the “hello” request, the server replies back to the bot with a “Hello
there!” response message. The bot continues to send out “hello” requests to the server on
a timed loop to simulate bot traffic on the network. This interface allows the bot to send
messages to the server in the following form: response = client.get(command_url). When
the bot needs to send data to the server the interface, the format is: response =
client.post(command_url, {data_dictionary}). The command_url specifies the function
that will be executed by the server and is a unique URL for each function in the server
that processes a command. The response will be assigned by the server and may contain
any data that the server needs to provide the client to process the command.
Essentially, a bot client’s post or get request to the appropriate URL starts the
corresponding command function specified in the server, and the value assigned to the
reply is the return value that the server function passes as a remote procedure call return
to the bot client. For example, the Sample Bot server, when executed, provides an
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interface for the bot by creating its hello URL with the command: cc.get(“/”, hello). This
simply provides the HTTP_Bot class with communication interface of the root URL, “/”
and with the command hello as defined within the server’s file. The bot, upon execution,
starts by sending a hello message to the server with the following command: resp =
client.get(“/”). The command, client.get(“/”) invokes the hello function in the server
which logs the request, then returns the string “hello there!” back to the bot. The return
value, “hello there!” is then assigned to the resp variable in the bot code. The bot logs
the response from the server and returns (‘hello’, 10) to the HTTP_Bot framework
instantiation, which simply sets a 10 second delay and the next command, hello in this
case, for the bot to execute. The sequence diagram in Figure 1 depicts the interaction
between the sample bot and CC server.

Figure 1: Sample Bot Sequence Diagram
BlackEnergy Botnet
A more capable and robust bot, also built on top of the HTTP_Bot class of the
Enhanced SLINGbot framework, is the BlackEnergy botnet was provided by Mitre. The
basic implementation does some more interesting things than the sample bot described
previously. All of the commands are encoded with a 64-bit encoding from Python’s
Base64 library before being sent over the network (Python, 2012a).
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Before the commands are encoded with Base64, they are first embedded into a
BlackEnergy command string, with each part of the string delimited by a hash tag. The
string has the following format: header#command#delay#bot_id, where the header is an
arbitrary string that is not explicitly used by the sample BlackEnergy bot or CC server.
The command section contains the name of the next command the bot is to execute, delay
is an integer representation of the number of seconds the bot should wait before executing
the command, and the bot_id is a unique ID number provided by the bot when it connects
to the server, and when it passes a reply to the server with the stat command.
This command string is then 64-bit encoded and sent to the bot as the return value
of the handle_stat function from the server. After the encoded URL is posted, the bot
reads the posted message, decodes and executes the command, and returns a relevant
reply back to the server in clear text. A simple upgrade would allow the bot to also
encrypt its reply messages to the server.
This BlackEnergy bot network simulates real-world bot activity by generating
randomly chosen commands, at random intervals, to do the following: send a stat
message to the bot, that responds with the bot’s unique ID number; and send a file to the
bot containing a random set of text characters, compressed by Python’s Zlib, from the
server to one of the bots in the network (Python, 2012b).
The random file generation capability is representative of the fact that a botmaster
may choose to send any file of his or her choosing at any given time. The fact that the
server randomizes when to send is also typical of a botnet, since some bots and their
servers may lie dormant for great lengths of time, with sporadic periods of activity at
predetermined or otherwise intermittent times.
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The CC server sets the stat function interface by calling cc.post(‘/dot/stat.php’,
handle_stat).

This allows the bot to post its reply to the web server by calling

client.post(‘/dot/stat.php’,{‘id’:BOT_ID}). This command posts the bot’s ID number to the
server in the form of a Python dictionary object. The Python’s dictionary object may
contain an arbitrary number of entries as key-value pairs (in this case the key is the string
‘id’ and the value is the BOT_ID number randomly generated by the bot at runtime), and
each entry may contain any data type, such as a file, string, list, etc., which provides the
ability for the bot to post any data required by the server. The dictionary entries are
passed to the server who can then read the necessary entries to complete the requested
command.
The resp variable is read by the bot and contains the server’s reply comprised of
the encoded command argument from the server. The bot uses the Python Base64 library
to decode the command argument, then parses the argument and returns the next
command and delay provided by the server back to its parent class, the HTTP_Bot
instance, which processes the next command.
The actual BlackEnergy botnet variants found in the wild are “…an HTTP-based
botnet used primarily for DDoS attacks by the Russian hacker underground” (Koo et al.,
2011). Koo further explains that the BlackEnergy bots connect only periodically to their
CC servers in order to query the server for the next command to execute. They do not
maintain a persistent connection with the server, but rather connect to send information or
queries and immediately disconnect once the information is sent. This periodic
connection is also typical of the HTTP protocol used by standard web servers and by the
other HTTB botnet variants.
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Torpig Botnet
The Torpig botnet, also built on the HTTP_Bot framework, consists of a bot, an
Inject server, a CC server, and a Mebroot server.

Each of the servers may be

implemented on separate machines, and they each provide different services to the bot.
This layout provides resiliency by allowing a distributed server base, as well as a
distributed botnet. The drawback to this topology, however, is that if any part of the
server is unavailable, the bot network will either be only partially functional or not
functional at all.
In a real-world implementation of the Torpig botnet, each server has a specific
purpose (Kemmerer, 2012). Target pages are chosen, such as bank login pages, and
when a target is visited, the Torpig CC server issues a request to the inject server, and
ports its version of the web page into the victim’s browser. As you can guess, the login
credentials are returned to the Torpig CC server and subsequently used to defraud the
victim. The Mebroot CC server installs the Mebroot rootkit on the victim’s machine
usually via a Drive-by-download attack. If successful, this allows the botmaster to take
full control of the victim’s machine.
The simple implementation provided with the Enhanced SLINGbot framework
emulates some of the traffic created by the real world botnet. The bot will receive
simulated code updates from the Mebroot server. The bot receives a fake web form from
the Inject server, and it sends phony stolen log in credentials to the Torpig CC server.
Before the bot or servers send any messages, the commands or data are encrypted
by the Torpig Encryption Algorithm. This algorithm first applies a keyed exclusive or
(xor) sequence, and then encodes the message with Python’s base64 library. All three
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Torpig servers and the bots share the same encryption key, and are thus able to decrypt
the messages by first decoding the message with base64, then running the decoded
message through the same xor sequence. This encryption scheme presents challenges to
the detection of this botnet’s messages. Fortunately, each unique unencrypted message
directly maps to a single unique encrypted message, and similarities in the messages can
be keyed in on with detection rules. Figure 2 shows this algorithm in detail.
Enhanced SLINGbot Torpig Encryption Algorithm
TORPIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY
“1234ABC”
xor(string)
data “”
for character in string
for key_char in TORPIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY
character
binary.xor(character, key_char)
data data + character
return data
def encrypt(input_string)
return_string xor(input_string)
return Python.base64.encode(return_string)
def decrypt(input_string)
return_string Python.base64.decode(input_string)
return xor(return_string)

Figure 2: Enhanced SLINGbot Encryption Algorithm

The White-hat Bot
The WHB is a distributed network monitoring tool that uses the Snort IDS to
detect botnet threats. Any alerts triggered on the networked nodes are returned to the CC
node. At the CC node, these alerts are analyzed to build a complete picture of any
malicious botnet threats found within the network. From the CC node, new detection
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rules can be created and distributed to detect novel threats. Some of the pertinent
functionality of the WHB is described next.
The WHB is implemented by building upon the BlackEnergy Bot example
application provided in the Enhanced SLINGbot framework from Mitre. Significant
modification and the addition of substantial new functionality have resulted in the WHB
in its current form. Included in this added functionality is the ability to send and retrieve
files between the bots and server, the ability to traverse bot host file systems, to execute
arbitrary code on bot client machines, to start the Snort IDS, to update Snort with custom
rules used to detect novel botnets, to retrieve a list of all executing processes and network
packet capture logs, to correlate the logs into a map of the infections found within the
network, etc. The primary goal of adding this functionality is to enable the WHB with
the capabilities necessary to detect and capture bot binaries. This is for the purpose of the
creation of new botnet detection rules and strategies in order to combat novel bot variants
on a user’s machine, server machines, or on honeypot machines or networks.
Highlights of some of the relevant bot functionality of the WHB created during
this research effort follows.
Log files
Each bot and CC server creates a log file that contains a record of each command
sent/received and the actions taken as a result.

The limited log functionality as

implemented by the authors of Enhanced SLINGbot only printed log messages to the
terminal. Functionality was added to enable this data to also write to a text file output in
addition to the terminal. Also, a more verbose logging scheme is implemented to more
fully document all of the actions of each bot and server instantiation.
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Set bot’s ID number from the CC server
The server is capable of setting and resetting each bot’s individual identifier as
desired. This was accomplished by creating a setbid function call that the server can
invoke upon the bot with the argument of the new bot ID. Initial trial runs with 90+
nodes have proven this option to be useful, by allowing the botmaster to rename nodes so
that they have useful identities that relate to the physical machine on which they operate.
Return system info
A sysinfo command returns the following information about the system the bot
instance runs on: computer name, OS type, release number, version, and machine
architecture. A sample return looks like this:
sysinfo
******************************************************************
2012-03-15 10:09AM - System information
OS type: Linux
Computer name: gubuntu
Release: 3.0.0-16-generic
Version information: #28-Ubuntu SMP Fri Jan 27 17:50:54 UTC 2012
Machine architecture: i686
******************************************************************

Figure 3: Sysinfo Command Return
All command modifier
The botmaster uses the all modifier before a command to specify that command to
be sent to each connected bot. This simulates a multicast message to all live bots in the
network, thus reducing the workload for the human operator when all bots are to
complete the same task. This is implemented by keeping an up-to-date list of online bots
in the server application, and when a message is intended for all bots, the server loops
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through the list, sending the same command to each bot individually by implementation
of an at-most-once methodology.
Multicast scalability
Analogous to sending a single command to all bots, sending a single command to
a specific single bot can be achieved by appending the bot ID before the command, or by
typing the command at the interface when that specific bot is currently at the head of the
FIFO command queue. If it is not the case that the intended recipient is at the head of the
queue of the CC server, then the server must cycle through each connected bot until it
reaches the target bot. These scalability limitations of the WHB have not posed an issue
during any of the experiments, and it is known that for a WHB network with 96 nodes
that there are no significant performance degradations. The limitations of scalability will
become problematic at some arbitrarily large unknown network size. The problem is
discussed in chapter V and a remedy is deferred to future work.
Command interface
The user-friendly server interface makes it simple to communicate commands to a
specified bot, or to propagate a command to all bots. The text in the list of connected
bots contains the current bot highlighted in yellow font (gray-scaled in this text):
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**********************************************
Connected bots: 7078 4768 9272
Next command to 7078:
**********************************************

Figure 4: WHB Command Terminal
Botmap and showbotnets commands
The botmap command, sent with the all command modifier, propagates to all the
connected WHB bots. The bots capture the current state of their Snort alert logs and
return these log files to the CC server. Once all the logs are retrieved, the showbotnets
command parses the alert logs and builds a log containing the consolidated data for all
the malicious botnet applications found within the network. The list that is printed to the
terminal contains the bot application type, and the IP address for each bot or CC server
located on each machine. Additionally, a more verbose log file is produced by this
command that displays the name of each botnet application type found, the IP addresses
of each application, the ports used by each IP address, the number of messages sent from
each port, and a sum total of the number of messages sent from each bot instance at each
given IP address. An example of the output of the showbotnets command is shown
below in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Showbotnets output
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Emulab Testbed
Emulab is a network testbed located within the University of Utah (Emulab,
2012). It provides a large number of customizable network nodes that can emulate
virtually any network topology specified, within the limits of available nodes. Each node
can be customized to the user’s needs by preloading any specified OS, along with any
other software provided by the user. This allows the user to create a large heterogeneous
or homogenous network of nodes, configured with network switches, hubs, and links in
whatever topology is desired. When an experiment is started, the specified network is
created and each node is booted and loaded with the specified software, allowing for
research experimentation in a virtualized environment.
The Emulab website provides a Java applet that allows visual creation of the
network using drag-and-drop to add nodes into the network, to create network links, and
to specify OS and other optional software to add to each node. Given a network as input,
the application generates a Name Script (NS) file that is used to create and run the
experiment. The file can then be further modified textually as needed before starting the
generation of the emulation of the trial. Further, the application provides an interface to
access each node with SSH during the process of an experiment by double-clicking the
icon that represents the node of interest.
Figure 6 shows a view of an active 13-node experiment running on the Emulab
testbed.
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Figure 6: Emulab Experiment Web Interface
From this browser interface you can see a visual representation of the
experimental network as it is running. Visual options allow you to modify and restart the
current experiment, terminate it, check the active status of each node, access the boot logs
of each node, and perform a number of other useful administrative functions. This allows
you to monitor the network at a glance and facilitates easy problem identification and
remediation.
Launching Botnet experiments on Emulab
Emulab allows creation of a Network Simulation (NS) script used to specify
network topology, the operating system to load on each node, and any software that
should be pre-loaded into a specified directory location for each node specified.
Additionally, a single command can be issued for each node to start an application at
node boot time. During experiment creation, Emulab places a text file into the directory
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/etc/hosts, on each node, that contains the IP address and node name of each node in the
experimental network.
I created a Python script, updatehosts.py, which takes as input the Emulab
provided hosts file, and the botnet configuration text file. The application starts by
reading the Emulab hosts text file, line by line, and builds a list of IP address, node name
pairs. Next, the script parses the botnet configuration file, which tells the application
which malicious bot applications should be installed on which nodes. Then, the script
determines the operating system’s node name by calling the OS system call:
os.uname()[1] which returns index 1 of a list of system attributes, index 1 being the
computer name of the node.
Using this information, updatehosts.py uses a series of decision structures to
determine which bots and servers are to be started based upon the operating node’s name,
thus executing the appropriate applications. This also allows bots to connect to the
appropriate server by inserting the appropriate IP address of the server node(s) as input
arguments to start the bot applications as necessary. If the node is designated as a server,
it will immediately start the applicable server process on the specified port. Any bot
execution is set to be delayed 120 seconds to provide a reasonable chance for the
corresponding server to boot prior to a connection attempt. After the script starts all the
applicable malware for a given node, it then starts the WHB client software and Snort
application.
This delay strategy has proven to be more than sufficient because Emulab does
synchronize the event start script such that no applications begin execution on any node
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until all nodes have booted and are ready. The delay my script imposes ensures that all
the CC servers have ample time to boot on every node prior to the bot applications.
In Emulab, it is possible to create a barrier to guarantee a boot ordering to ensure
that all servers are up before any bot is allowed to execute.

This has not proven

necessary, since the current method accomplished the desired result. If problems result in
the future from the current configuration at boot time, such a mechanism will be required.
With 96 nodes, the current implementation is a viable solution with a 100% success rate
for a simple boot test that was conducted during development of the WHB. No tests were
performed to measure the failure rate if the network grows to a larger scale. Since a
larger network of more than 96 nodes is beyond the reasonable limits of the Emulab
testbed, given its typical workload, this problem will not need to be remedied during the
course of this research, but rather a solution is deferred to future work if it becomes
necessary.
Command and Control (CC) terminal
In order for a human operator to take control of the WHB CC server, the server is
manually started after the experiment has been created and all of the other software is
automatically started. The 120 second delay executed by the updatehosts.py script
provides sufficient time for the botmaster to connect via Secure Shell (SSH) into the
control node to manually start the WHB CC server application prior to any bot’s attempt
to connect. This allows the botmaster to have full control of the CC server in an SSH
terminal, and has proven successful in all trials.
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Experimental Setup and Metrics
All experiments were all conducted on the Emulab testbed. I conducted trials
using BotHunter, the WHB with the standard Snort rule sets, the WHB with custom built
rules, and the WHB with random bot network configurations. The setup for these trials is
explained in this section.
BotHunter Baseline Trial
Figure 7 shows the general network configuration of this baseline trial
experiment.

Figure 7: BotHunter Trial Network Diagram
BotHunter is installed on nodeF to scan all the traffic that traverses between the
two networks. The trusted network that BotHunter protects consists of the bot infected
nodes on the right, connected directly to LAN1. All of the nodes on the left side of the
graph, nodes A through E, are running the CC servers for each of the three botnet
varieties. LAN0 connects this network to the BotHunter node, nodeF. NodeF is also
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connected, via a separate network adapter, to Lan1. This configuration requires that all
traffic between the two networks traverse nodeF, allowing BotHunter to scan all of the
traffic sent between the two networks.
This network uses the standard, network monitor node, BotHunter configuration
as recommended by the authors of the software. Three bots of each of the three varieties
(Torpig, BlackEnergy and Sample Bot) are represented in this trial. At the
commencement of the trial, each of the bots connect to each of their respective CC
servers and spend an hour of real time sending messages back and forth between the two
networks while nodeF scans and analyzes the traffic for botnet activity.
Initial WHB trial with standard Snort Rules
This WHB trial is conducted to determine if the standard set of Snort rules is
sufficient to detect novel botnets, such as those represented by the Enhanced SLINGbot
malicious botnets provided by Mitre Corporation. A thirteen node experiment is created
with the nodes numbered nodeA through nodeM, with the botnet and Snort software
installed as specified below in Table 1.
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Table 1: 13-node Preliminary Experiment
Node Name
nodeA
nodeB
nodeC
nodeD
nodeE
nodeF
nodeG
nodeH
nodeI
nodeJ
nodeK
nodeL
nodeM

Malicious Bot Software
Torpig Merboot Svr
Torpig CC
Torpig Inject Svr
Torpig Bot
Torpig Bot
BlackEnergy CC
BlackEnergy Bot
BlackEnergy Bot
BlackEnergy Bot
Sample Bot CC
Sample Bot
Sample Bot
None

WHB Software
WHB
WHB
WHB
WHB
WHB
WHB
WHB
WHB
WHB
WHB
WHB
WHB
WHB CC

Snort
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

As shown in Table 1, this preliminary experiment is set with nodeM as the WHB
CC node, and with the WHB client software operating on each of the other nodes.
Additionally, malicious bot or server code is deployed onto each of the other 12 nodes
such that each of the three malicious botnets is fully represented within the experiment.
For the purposes of this trial, as the experiment runs, any suspicious network traffic alerts
are captured from nodes A through L and further analyzed at the WHB CC node.
This trial is set up in the simple star network topology shown below in Figure 8.
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Figure 8: WHB with standard Snort rules trial
WHB trial with Snort custom rules for Enhanced SLINGBot detection
The custom rules trial incorporates custom Snort rules that were created based
upon the network traffic generated by the malicious botnets in the prior standard Snort
Rules Trial. The network and setup mirrors the setup of the previous trial as shown in
Table 1 and Figure 8. These rules attempt to detect each of the malicious botnets in such
a way that each botnet may be identified individually. These rules also attempt to create
categorized alerts based upon the message type, such as BlackEnergy CC command
message, or BlackEnergy Bot stat reply. With the addition of any custom rules that are
found to be useful for detection of a specific threat, whenever the WHB is deployed in
the future, these rules can be included to attempt detection of any of the malicious botnets
listed earlier in Table 1.
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Random network experiments
For these trials, I conducted a total of ten experiments using a 15-node star
network topology, similar to the 13-node network portrayed in Figure 8. I added the bot
networks with random distributions across the network with some tunable parameters.
Within the random setup parameters, I specify the total number of nodes. I also
specify the minimum and maximum number of bot nodes of each variety that the script
will choose to distribute over the network. For each of the 15-node trials, I set the
number of nodes to 15, the minimum number of bots to two, and the maximum number
of bots to five. The script is required by default to install one CC node for each of the bot
networks, each of which is assigned to a random node. Then, for each variety of bot it
chooses a random number of bot nodes, within the maximum and minimum thresholds
set, and installs them on arbitrary nodes.
The WHB CC application is installed on the first experiment node, and the WHB
clients are installed on every node, including the first node. Then, as described, all the
nodes are randomly assigned malicious bot and CC applications. The result is a random
malicious network where a given node may contain zero, one, or more malicious bots
and/or CC applications. Below, Table 2 displays the output of a 15-node randomized
setup with the minimum number of bots set to two and the maximum number set to five
for each variety of bot.
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Table 2: Random Network Setup
Node
nodeA
nodeB
nodeC
nodeD
nodeE
nodeF
nodeG
nodeH
nodeI
nodeJ
nodeK
nodeL
nodeM
nodeN
nodeO

Malware
Sample Bot CC
BlackEnergy Bot
Sample Bot

Malware

Malware

Malware

BlackEnergy Bot

Sample Bot

Torpig Bot

Torpig CC

BlackEnergy CC

Torpig Inject Svr

BlackEnergy Bot

BlackEnergy Bot
Torpig Merboot Svr
BlackEnergy Bot

Torpig Bot

This particular execution of the setup script is illustrative of the random
distribution of botnet applications produced by the random network setup script and
resulted in a total of five BlackEnergy bots, two Torpig bots, and two Sample Bots.
A randomized setup for each experiment provides a more realistic environment
for the WHB to attempt its detection operations. In the previous experiments it was clear
up front on which node each malicious bot and CC server operated. In reality we are
never going to know in advance where bot software will be placed within our network;
hence, the decision was made to randomize the setup.
Assumptions/Limitations
This research assumes that the Snort Intrusion Detection System (Snort IDS)
application, including any of its hardware and software dependencies, is pre-installed on
each of the analyzed user systems. Also, it is assumed that full permission is granted to
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do whatever is necessary to the user’s system, including full read and write access to any
files, applications, binaries, etc that may exist on said machine with no regard to the
privacy issues that exist in a real-world scenario in which this type of detection operation
would typically apply. Additionally, permission is assumed to install, to modify, and to
operate any necessary applications to facilitate detection operations and to capture and
analyze any network communication packets that originate from or terminate at said
machine.
Since the experimentation involves computing equipment connected to live
networks, to include the internet, I am limited to simulated malicious bot networks that
are benign in nature and have no method of self replication. This software otherwise
simulates network traffic typically generated by software that might be seen in a realworld malicious botnet found in the wild. Using simulated malware is a precaution to
ensure there is no accidental release of malicious code to the wild during the process of
investigations and experimentation.
Additionally, this simulated malware novel, in that there are no anti-virus
definitions, or other SSP applications, that are already preconfigured with signatures
created specifically for this software. Any positive detection that results from the
existing software trials in these experiments denotes the generality of that software in
detecting novel threats.
In this research effort, I concentrate on a network of Ubuntu Linux operating
systems, with the bot networks programmed, both the WHB and simulated malicious
varieties, in the Python programming language using the Enhanced SLINGbot framework
made available to me from Mitre Corporation. Whatever is accomplished on this system
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is assumed to be representative of what may be accomplished on other systems, using
other programming languages, given that all other defensive mechanisms of the systems
and those of the networks involved are otherwise similar.
For all the experiments in this study, the nodes each run the Ubuntu Linux version
10.04.1 operating system, with Python version 2.6 and Snort version 9.4.1. Additionally,
each node ran zero, one or more of the Enhanced SLINGbot versions of simulated
malicious botnets, and the WHB software. BotHunter is used in a preliminary
experiment to build a baseline for comparison against other methods of botnet detection.
With the exception of the baseline BotHunter experiment, in all of the additional trials,
the malware is actively trying its exploits on the systems, while the WHB attempts to
detect the presence of the bots by scanning the systems with Snort.
At first, only the standard Snort rules are used to attempt detection. If there are
undetected botnets, then a sample of all the traffic is captured and additional rules are
created to trigger alerts for the botnet messages. The new rules are deployed and
implemented by the WHB. Next, new logs will be gathered based upon any alerts logged
by these new custom rules. When the bots return these logs to the CC server, automated
analysis of the alert logs is conducted to determine all of the detected botnets is the
network and the data is correlated.
Summary
The Snort IDS is an important component of the WHB concept which will aid in
the successful detection of novel bot activity. The Enhanced SLINGbot code framework
further aids in this research by simulating real-world bots without the risk of the
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propagation of real-world malicious applications. Utilizing botnet techniques, combined
with the abilities of Snort, provides a versatile toolset with functionality for immediate
action to detect novel botnets. The Emulab testbed is a useful platform that has
successfully facilitated all experimentation to test the scalability and feasibility of the
WHB concept. Finally, BotHunter is an existing botnet detection tool that helped to
create a baseline of comparison to evaluate the WHB.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Chapter Overview
This chapter discusses the results of the experimental trails conducted during the
course of this research effort. The first trial discussed is done with BotHunter to set a
baseline for the detection abilities afforded by the WHB. The second is designed to test
the ability of Snort to detect the novel Enhanced SLINGbot malware variants. The
subsequent trials demonstrate the viability of the WHB by applying custom Snort rules as
a detection tool.
Results of Experiment Scenarios
BotHunter Baseline Trial
In a baseline trial experiment, the Enhanced SLINGbot malicious botnets were
scanned in action by the BotHunter software. The results of this trial are telling, after an
hour of botnet operation of all three varieties, BotHunter found none of the traffic to be
suspicious and hence triggered no alerts.
Another research study showed BotHunter to be a viable tool that can successfully
detect many known botnet variants (Sevy, 2009). In his study, Sevy constructed a
network and released the following real-world malicious botnets: Agobot, Phatbot, Rxbot
and Sdbot. In addition to these real-world botnets, he created his own novel botnet by
modifying and deploying as a botnet a program called Cybercraft. Sevy found that
BotHunter easily detected three of the four known real-world botnets. Of these botnets, it
was unable to detect his novel botnet creation or the preexisting Sdbot version he tested.
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As was Sevy’s experience with his custom novel Cybercraft botnet, I too found
that the novel SLINGbot botnets were not detected by BotHunter. This lack of detection
revealed a 100% false negative detection rate for the novel botnets I tested.
Initial WHB trial with standard Snort Rules
By running the 13-node trial with all three botnets fully represented, no Snort
alerts were triggered by the botnet traffic for the standard Snort rule set for a one hour
period. As was the case with BotHunter, the lack of detection showed the result was a
100% false negative detection rate for this trial. Since no alerts were triggered, a
representative sample of the network traffic logs was manually analyzed to further refine
the detection process. This analysis resulted in the custom rules applied in the
subsequent trials.
WHB trial with Snort custom rules for Enhanced SLINGBot detection
This experiment was conducted as a precursor to subsequent testing in an effort to
test the custom rules that were developed as a result of the previous Snort standard rule
trial. The experiment resulted in successful detection and identification of each type of
botnet message created by each bot and CC server, with a few minor exceptions.
When the Black Energy server receives a file download request from a bot, this
message contains detectable elements. The packets that contain the actual file returned
from the server; however, are not detectable by any type of pattern matching because it is
a completely randomized file that is sent as the reply. This file is created with a random
generator for each request, thus the entire message is completely different each time. All
of the other messages to and from the Black Energy bot are fully detectable, and the bot
and server send these detectable messages before and after sending the scrambled file
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messages. The only thing we have to key in on for the scrambled messages are the IP
addresses and ports of the sender and receiver for these messages.
This successful detection will allow for further and more detailed analysis in the
random network experiments that follow.
Random network experiments
In all of the 15-node trials, every node running botnet applications was correctly
identified as such, with a few minor exceptions. Each experiment was terminated as soon
as all detectable bot applications were correctly identified. For this reason, some of the
total numbers of alerts may appear small; this is simply because the detected application
did not have the time to send many messages prior to termination of the experiment. An
overview of each of the 15-node trials appears below in Table 3.
Table 3: 15-node Trial Statistics
Trial #

Total Bots /
Total
Servers

Elapsed time
to full
detection in
minutes

Total Alerts
Logged

Bots not
detected
(on their CC
node)

Bots not
detected
(multiple on
single node)

Conservative
detection
rate

Liberal
detection
rate

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

9/5
12/5
14/5
13/5
11/5
12/5
13/5
12/5
12/5
11/5

6
8
8
7
6
8
7
7
7
6

106
177
164
139
127
188
157
146
138
104

0
0
2
2
0
2
0
0
0
0

0
3
3
1
0
1
2
1
2
1

100.00%
82.35%
73.68%
83.33%
100.00%
82.35%
88.89%
94.12%
88.24%
93.75%

100.00%
100.00%
89.47%
88.89%
100.00%
88.24%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%

In the two right-hand columns of Table 3, I have delineated two separate detection
rates for the bot applications in the trial. The calculation for the conservative detection
rate is:

, where

the trial.
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are malicious applications used in

The conservative detection rate is based upon the sum of the non-detection tallies
in both non-detection reason categories listed in the table: multiple bots on single node,
and bots that are undetectable because they operate on their CC server node.
To reduce ambiguity and to avoid the double counting of non-detected
applications, if there exists multiple bots that also reside on their CC node, they will only
be listed under the single non-detection category of on their CC node.
The liberal detection rate only counts a bot as undetected if it resides on its CC
node and is determined to be undetected for that reason. The consolidated overall
detection rates were 88.17% (conservative), and 96.45% for the liberal rate.
The communications frequencies of the botnets are randomized, with fairly low
frequencies. The slowest to communicate, due to their delay settings, are the Torpig
botnets. These longer delay settings for initial communications account for the six to
eight minute times that the WHB takes to reach full network detection. In a real world
scenario, this time could be much longer, or much shorter, depending on the rate of
chatter produced by the bot networks under investigation.
The total number of botnet servers remained a constant throughout the trials, three
servers for the Torpig botnet, one for the Sample Bot, and one for the BlackEnergy
botnet. The number of bots for each variety was randomly chosen between two and five,
and the overall number of bots ranged from 9 to 14 for these trials.
With an overall total of 70 minutes of detection time, a total of 1,446 alerts were
logged. This resulted in an average of 21 messages flagged during each minute the
experiments ran.
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The first detection complication occurs because of the HTTP botnet architecture.
Given an implementation of this architecture, each of the CC servers always listens on a
specified port, making their detection relatively simple. Each bot within a given CC
server’s network always connects to this CC server’s port to send its messages. In
contrast, the bot nodes do not maintain a persistent connection with their CC server.
Instead, they initiate a new connection each time they send data or new requests to the
server. After sending a command, their communications session is terminated. They
subsequently reconnect to the CC server again, only after some arbitrary amount of time
has elapsed, in order to send their next message. As a result, the bot may be assigned a
different send port at the will of the underlying operating system’s communications
facilities. This phenomenon is especially prevalent with the traffic created by the Torpig
bots, and the hypothesis is that this is because they each connect with three different
servers over the course of time.
Table 4 contains an example of a node on which only a single Torpig bot
operated, in which five different ports were assigned over the period that lasted a total of
six minutes, in which time this bot sent a total of 12 messages.
Table 4: Torpig Bot example from 15-node trial 2
Node

Botnet SW

Detected?

Total Alerts

Port

# Msg

Port

# Msg

Port

# Msg

Port

# Msg

Port

# Msg

nodeh

TorBot

Yes

12

42779

2

44583

2

44584

2

45885

4

58604

2

Because of these non-persistent connections, a single bot instance that sends n
messages to a single CC server may potentially send these messages from n different
send ports. When the case exists that a single node has two or more instances of a
specific bot type operating on it, and each instance shares a common CC server, then it
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becomes impossible from the alert data to determine if there is only one, or more than
one, instance of that specific bot operating on that specific node.
This limitation is only minor since we are able to determine that at least one bot
of a specific type is operating on a node. If the node is later cleaned of the malware, if
only one instance is removed where more instances exist, then additional alerts will be
generated when the remaining bot instances re-connect to their CC servers. Also, the
malware that is removed is possibly the same software that all instances of the bot on the
node use, such that its removal destroys any instances that were there. This is the case
with the botnets used in this trial, as configured; however, the application could just as
easily be replicated into multiple directories on the node and executed from each of these
copies.
Given that we know that one or more bots of a specific type that report to a
common CC server based upon alerts triggered is sufficient to justify the use of the
liberal detection rate. Though we can’t always definitively assign a total number to the
bot instances on a node, we can still show that alerts were logged for every instance of
each bot of that type that sent out communications packets. For this reason, I favor the
liberal detection rate, since multiple bots of a single type who report to a single CC node
can arguably be considered identified when only one is detected.
When multiple bots of the same type are on a specific host, we do see an increase
in the number of outgoing ports and an increase in the number of packets logged. When
these data items are compared to other nodes within the same botnet, this can potentially
provide a cue that there may be more than one bot on a node. One can see from the
results of the more simple Sample Bot that where there are two bots operating on a given
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node, there are usually only two outgoing ports used, and where there is only one bot,
there is only one outgoing port, and roughly half the traffic. Table 5 shows an example
of this phenomenon in action.
Table 5: Sample Bot example from Random 15-node Trial 3
Node

IP

Botnet SW

Detected?

nodef

10.1.1.7

sampleBot

Yes

nodef

10.1.1.7

sampleBot

No

nodeo

10.1.16

sampleBot

Yes

Non-detect reason

Total Alerts

Port

# Msg

Port

# Msg

6

33368

2

33370

4

4

54396

4

*2 on node

Looking at Table 5, one might be inclined to claim that both bots on nodeF were
detected, and they would be correct in that assumption in this case since we know that by
comparing the message alert logs to the random setup log that message alerts were indeed
logged for both instances of the bot because there are definitely two bots on the node.
Thus it should be safe to state that they were both detected, or should it?
In real life situations we don’t have the malware network layout to refer to later to
confirm or refute our assumptions based on empirical detection results. The problem
with making such assumptions brings me back to Table 4, wherein a single bot instance
sent outgoing messages on five different ports. Since this is the inherent nature of HTTP
bots, all that can ever really be said about a specific node when alerts are triggered for a
specific bot type is that there is at least one bot on that particular node of the bot type
identified, but there may also be more. The only way, given the methods used in this
research, to definitively determine that more than one bot of a specified type operate on a
single node is if the two bots report to different CC servers, and thus belong to different
bot networks. Other methods, such as analyzing the running processes on the node can
help to determine such a situation.
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Another detection limitation of the WHB occurs when a CC server and one or
more bots within that server’s domain all operate on the same node. When this occurs,
any communications between the bot(s) on that node and CC server do not result in
network packages being sent across the wire. Instead, the underlying communications
facilities deliver these messages between the applications through the loopback Ethernet
adapter. Snort is configured such that it monitors only a single specified network adapter.
Snort is capable of monitoring the loopback adapter; however, for the purposes of this
research it is monitors the Ethernet adapter that connects the node to the network. No
alert is triggered for this reason.
One potential solution to this problem is to execute two instances of the Snort
application, one to monitor the external network adapter and the second to monitor the
loopback interface. Since each instance of Snort is only capable of monitoring a single
adapter, this is the only solution to this problem when using Snort as the payload. This is
a resource intensive solution which was not attempted in this research effort. The
feasibility of this option was confirmed by reconfiguring Snort to monitor the loopback
adapter of a node to subsequently capture the packets generated by a Sample botnet that
operated on the same node.
This limitation is also minor in scope because a botnet that operates on a single
node is ineffective and will likely not accomplish anything useful for the botmaster.
Additionally, we have shown that it is possible to detect this situation by monitoring the
traffic on the loopback interface. If a bot and CC server both operate on the same node in
a useful botnet, then the CC server or the bot will also necessarily communicate with
other nodes, thus producing network packets that can be used for detection purposes.
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With these packets we can detect the server, and any of the other nodes with which it
directly communicates. If the CC server and all of the non-CC node bots are removed
from the network, the bot on the old CC server node will likely be rendered useless,
unless it has a backup server with which it will later communicate, in which case it can
later be detected when it sends messages to its other server.
For the reasons mentioned, when monitoring network packets for botnet
application traffic, neglecting to scan the traffic that may appear on the loopback adapters
of monitored nodes does not pose much of a threat. If a bot connects to a CC application
on the same node, that bot is of little or no use to the botmaster and is likely
inconsequential to the success of the botnet. Neglecting such an application, while
undesirable, is unlikely to cause any real harm.
The exception to this problem for the botnets tested is the Torpig bot, which
communicates with three different servers. If the bot operates on one of the nodes with
which one or two of its servers resides, it is still detectible through its communications
with the server(s) located on other node(s). However, like the single-server
configuration, if the bot and all three servers operate on the same machine, then that bot
instance produces no network packets, but the bot then becomes next to useless to the
botnet given no other means of communication with other nodes.
Figure 9 illustrates the results of the first 15-node random setup experiment.
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Figure 9: 15-node random botnet trial 1
In this trial, there were a total of 106 Snort alerts triggered, properly identifying
all of the bots and CC servers in the network. Two of the three Torpig server nodes also
have Torpig bot applications running on their respective nodes, both nodes N and O. As
discussed earlier in this section, these bots were detected because they both communicate
with the other two servers through the network, while communicating with the servers on
their respective host nodes through local message passing handled by the local Kernel
and OS.
The total number of alerts triggered by each of the applications on each of the
nodes is noted in the diagram, after the name of the application, and after the arrow that
points in the direction of travel for the messages.
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Investigative Questions Answered
Will the WHB be more effective than current methods, such as typical botdetection software, to locate zero-day malicious bot network applications running on
infected hosts? If so, what methods and best practices must be applied to make this
possible?
This study has shown that the WHB, as it is currently implemented, can root out
botnet threats on a distributed system of nodes without regard to the limitations of
administrative boundaries. With the application of custom Snort rules, combined with
the distributed network of the WHB, the threats that can be detected are nearly limitless.
As alert data is returned to the CC node, a complete picture of the threats detected within
the network is assembled and presented.
Currently, manual intervention may be needed when novel threats go undetected
by the currently applied set of Snort rules. This manual intervention is required to ensure
that novel threats are correctly pinpointed such that new rules can be crafted to ensure
their future detection without risking false positive alerts being triggered also. Once a
new rule is properly crafted and sent out to the WHB network, all instances of that threat
will be detected, and alerts will be triggered the very moment the malicious application
attempts to communicate with any other node, whether or not the other node lies within,
or outside of, the detecting WHB network.
Will the distributive nature of botnets and the methods employed by malicious bot
masters be beneficial in the detection of novel bot threats?
This study has revealed the value of the distributed nature of botnets in spanning
multiple domains has proven useful in the detection of novel botnets. While the results of
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the alerts logged on an individual node can be useful in detecting botnets, this study has
shown that the combined alerts from a distributed network of nodes can aid in the
discovery of the entire malicious network. Further, from the centralized CC node,
additional analysis of message traffic can be accomplished to help identify novel threats,
and to build detection rules that can then be immediately distributed out to all the WHB
nodes.
Can the benefits of current tools be leveraged and amplified by their use in a
distributed bot network? If so, how?
This study has shown the viability of using distributed botnet technology as a
means of detecting and identifying malicious botnets. In this study, the WHB was used
with the Snort IDS; however, it can easily be reconfigured to use any tools that will aid in
the efficiency with which it is able to detect novel bot threats. This flexibility adds to the
usefulness of the WHB, since tools are updated and new tools are created constantly.
Summary
The final WHB trials conducted in this study produced a liberal detection rate of
96.45%. This is a significant finding that warrants further investigation into and
refinement of the WHB concept as a distributed bot network detection tool. Baseline
comparison trials using BotHunter and Snort with its standard rule sets resulted in no
successful detections of the novel threats studied. This lack of detection is a call for
better methods. The successful detections resulting from the WHB implementation with
custom rules show that this is a promising endeavor that should continue to be pursued.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter Overview
This chapter focuses first on the conclusions of this research effort to include the
advantages of the WHB. Then, I discuss recommendations for future research. Finally, I
conclude this study.
Conclusions of Research
Advantages of the WHB
One advantage that the WHB offers is that the packet capture and initial analysis
of packets is accomplished at each node individually by the Snort application. The
typical deployment of Snort in botnet detection requires a single Snort machine to be
dedicated to scan all the traffic within a given domain or network. This creates a
bottleneck in the network since it requires that all traffic be routed through the Snort
node. This may cause serious delays within the network, especially during periods of
peak traffic. When the Snort monitor node becomes overwhelmed with network traffic,
Snort will begin dropping packets to conserve bandwidth. The underlying OS may also
become overwhelmed with traffic, causing dropped packets and potentially an inordinate
number of message traffic failures. This may effectively be seen by the network users as
a DDoS attack, when in reality it is malware detection software causing the slowdown.
In contrast, by installing Snort on individual nodes, it thus increases the workload for
each node only slightly by requiring each to scan its own traffic, but it avoids the
bottleneck effect of a single monitor node.
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Another advantage gained by the WHB distributed employment of Snort is the
fact that the CC node can monitor the results of scans that reach a potentially limitless
number of administrative domains and networks. Then, the alerts from these distributed
nodes can be aggregated and used for further analysis at the CC level as necessary.
A useful feature of Snort that will be leveraged by the WHB in the future allows
for the logging of alerts to a standard port, which would allow for each node to report its
alerts to the CC node in an automated fashion such that a web interface or any number of
other possible alert notification systems can display these alerts in real-time to the CC
node. The current configuration only sends alert notifications in bulk and on demand to
the CC server, which will cause the network traffic to have large bursts when the CC
requests alert updates from a large network at the same time. This real-time forwarding
of alerts, as they are triggered and logged, will likely result in a more steady and
moderate stream of traffic, without large bursts.
Advanced rule refinement, to find more generalized patterns instead of specific
signatures, will aid in the detection of unknown suspicious activity and is an advertised
feature of Snort. Non-specific rules are likely to be more prone to false positive alerts
and false negative (no alert logged) responses. Since this is the case, these alerts will be
logged with a lower priority than known specific threats. These lower priority messages
must be further analyzed to determine whether they are a viable threat or not. If they are
found to be viable, then new rules can be created to pinpoint the new threat directly, thus
placing future messages from that threat into a known flagged category.
The question about false negatives is open ended and requires a priori knowledge
of the threat to detect any false negative condition. This is where simulated malware can
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aid in the process of rule development to overcome false negative conditions. With
malware that the researcher creates, the message patterns of this software can be studied
and dissected safely. If the malware resembles a future novel real-world exploit, the rules
created for its detection may also be effective in the detection of the emerging threat.
While this methodology does not provide any guarantees, since it is impossible to
anticipate all future threats, it can prove useful if the created rules are general enough to
spot threats that are similar in nature.
Recommendations for Future Research
Infection Vectors
One area that was not addressed in this research effort was infection vectors.
Potential exists for their application in criminal cases where law enforcement has
authorized the invasion of specified IP addresses or networks in order to take down a
specific threat. If duly authorized, a directed spreading mechanism could be employed to
propagate the WHB to any of the hosts that are authorized in order to covertly analyze
said machines and networks for malicious activity in order to find evidence to press
charges against the criminals responsible, and ultimately to dismantle the botnets
involved. Some of the infection vectors used in real-world malware could provide the
WHB with this capability, where authorized by law.
Data Mining
Further research into data mining the aggregated Snort logs in order to detect
botnets is warranted. I hypothesize that this is likely one of the best ways in which to
successfully move forward with the detection of novel botnet threats. All botnets,
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regardless of topology, must communicate and hence the best way to detect novel bot
threats is through the communications patterns they create. Further research in this area
will be able to refine and generate the most capable and robust botnet detection
algorithms possible.
Further research in this area may ultimately result in processes that can help to
reduce and potentially eliminate the need for manual intervention in order to create new
rules to pinpoint and detect novel threats as they arise. When generalized rules trigger
alerts, automated processes, if they are refined enough, may be able to create accurate
custom rules to precisely categorize a novel threat for future detection and eradication.
My hypothesis is that this is an open-ended problem that may never be fully
solvable since anticipating every future novel application that communicates with other
applications, in an effort to determine whether it is malicious or not, simply cannot be
done. Since the combined knowledge of SSPs has revealed only a finite number of
malicious applications, it stands to reason that there also exists some finite number of
unknown malicious applications at any given point in time. As time progresses, the
number of known and unknown malicious applications changes as threats are discovered
and as novel threats are created. As long as the number of unknown threats is greater
than zero, then the problem remains unsolved. If the number ever reaches zero, it is
unlikely to remain zero for long before a novel malware application is created and
deployed that is undetectable given the current set of detection algorithms, signatures,
and rules.
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Scalability Limitations
The multicast scalability of the WHB is currently limited because of the
configuration of the bot and server code. The way communications work is that each bot
connects with an initial command, stat, in which the bot reports its ID number to the CC
server. The CC server then queries the botmaster for the next command to be sent to the
bot. As each bot connects with a stat command, the CC server will answer each call in
the order it arrives. The problem with this configuration is that in order to get a response
back from a specific bot, the application must essentially cycle the stat requests of each
connected bot until the desired recipient bot is reached, then it must again cycle through
all n-1 bots before receiving a response to the message sent. This will lead to
unacceptable delays as n grows very large; therefore, a more fitting solution is needed in
order to deploy the WHB on a very large scale.
A simple solution would be to allow each bot to be individually contacted by the
server when necessary, but the problem is that the server never initiates contact with a
bot, but rather waits for the bots to contact it creating a FIFO message queue. Direct
addressing of a bot without cycling through the queue and sending network messages to
each bot in the list in order to locate the target bot would be more scalable. This is really
only an issue when targeting a specific bot when there are large numbers of bots
connected. An initial trial with 96 WHB nodes indicates that the issue does not cause
significant delays at this size, and the responsiveness of the botnet does not suffer
significantly at such a network size. Since the issue is not problematic at such a network
size, it will be ignored for the purposes of this research effort and deferred to future work.
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Summary
As bot and malware defenses advance, so do the tactics of hackers. The need to
stay a step ahead is critical. As the interests of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, and
other adversarial forces in hostile nations continue to gain interest and abilities in botnet
technology, the stakes have never been higher to build up and maintain solid defensive
strategies to protect our nation’s vital assets.
The WHB and other defensive tools can help mitigate the threats that are posed by
those who would damage and destroy. Further research and development of network
defense is the clarion call of the day.
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